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Sex Wars as Proxy Wars 
Aya Gruber 
Abstract 
The clash between feminists and queer theorists over the meaning of sex—danger versus 
pleasure—is well-trodden academic territory. Less discussed is what the theories have in 
common. There is an important presumption uniting many feminist and queer accounts of 
sexuality: sex, relative to all other human activities, is something of great, or grave, 
importance. The theories reflect Gayle Rubin’s postulation that “everything pertaining to 
sex has been a ‘special case’ in our culture.” In the #MeToo era, we can see all too clearly 
how sex has an outsized influence in public debate. Raging against sexual harm has become 
the preferred weapon of those attacking heterogenous power differentials. Focusing on sex, 
advocates wage proxy wars for other values, from equality in professor-grad student 
relationships to gender diversity on corporate boards. However, when we have our sex 
blinders on, it is difficult to seek remedies to—or even see—the problems for which sexual 
harm stood in as a proxy. In this essay, I make the case that combining queer-theoretical 
methods with a distinctly sex-indifferent stance brings a useful perspective to some of the 
thornier aspects of the contemporary debate over sex regulation. 
We must conduct our sexual politics in the real world. 
For women this is like advancing across a mined field. 
Looking only to your feet to avoid the mines means 
missing the horizon and the vision of why the advance 
 is worthwhile; but if you only see the future 
 possibilities, you may blow yourself up. 
Ellen Carol DuBois & Linda Gordon1
I. The Players: Feminist and Queer Theorists Signify Sex 
The clash between feminist legal theorists and queer theorists over the meaning of “sex” 
(as in intercourse, not biology-gender)2 became so polarized over the last several decades 
that it lends itself to caricature. With every vitriolic exchange, an increasingly vulgar vision 
of each camp emerged. Feminists are pearl-clutching, anxiety-ridden authoritarians, 
condemning men (and women who act like men) to the gallows and tsk-tsking at the 
patriarchy-blinded women who fail to recognize their subordination.3 Alternatively, 
 Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. I thank Janet Halley, Jennifer Hendricks, Duncan 
Kennedy, Ben Levin, Russell Robinson, and Ahmed White for their helpful feedback on ideas and drafts. 
Leah Travis provided excellent editorial assistance. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Joseph Fischel, who 
encouraged this queer-theory dilettante to take a risk and write this essay and who provided invaluable         
guidance with a deft editorial hand. 
1 Ellen Carol DuBois & Linda Gordon, Seeking Ecstacy on the Battlefield, in Pleasure and Danger:
Exploring Female Sexuality 42 (Carole S. Vance ed., 1984) [hereinafter Pleasure and Danger].
2 “Sex” will have this “sexual activity” meaning throughout. 
3 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Trafficking, Prostitution, and Inequality, 46 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 271, 296 
(2011) (describing sex workers rights activists’ characterization of anti-prostitution activists as “repressed 
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feminists are womyn-bonding, house plant-pruning female supremacists, insisting on 
“lesbian, entirely feminine,” yet hot-and-orgasmic sex, mostly with men.4 Queer theorists 
are “POMO’d”-out,5 gender-bending, sociopathic risk-seekers, with a dangerous moral 
relativism, or worse, a “rapeophile” ideology that sexual pain equals pleasure.6 Queer 
theorists are leather, and feminists are lace—or macramé. The debate between feminism 
and queer theory often reduces to one camp defending itself from the hyperbolic charges 
of the other. And to outside observers of this mudslinging, it all looks decidedly white, 
female (or gay male), and privileged.7 
Defenders of “dominance” feminism—the name ascribed to Catharine 
MacKinnon’s theory of sex and gender—dismiss the neo-Victorian caricature. They argue 
that MacKinnon’s sex-regulatory proposals, i.e., anti-pornography laws, are not about fear 
or moralism, but power.8 Because sexual subordination organizes gender, the argument 
goes, only strict regulation of sexual harm can produce justice. Nevertheless, as I explore 
below, in justifying its theoretical frame, dominance feminism vividly describes a world rife 
with horrific sexual danger. Its remedial program involves rapturous power reversals and 
movie-ending justice. The theory is thus tailor-made to produce a readership of anxious, 
frightened women, who hope authoritarian laws will protect them from the sexual danger 
all around and extract a pound of flesh from bad men. Dominance feminism’s 
retributive/protective gestalt thrives in today’s #MeToo world, even if few could identify 
the theory’s structuralist foundation.  
The caricature of the queer theorist is likewise extreme. Queer theorists do embrace 
postmodern analytic methods—notably the idea that power moves sneakily within 
interstices. Not all, however, are so POMO’d-out that they lapse into hopeless moral 
                                                 
puritan sex-panicked whiners who just don’t have what it takes to make it as whores”); see also Biddy Martin, 
Feminism, Criticism, and Foucault, 27 New German Critique 3, 11 (1982). 
4 Janet Halley, The Politics of Injury: A Review of Robin West’s Caring for Justice, 1 Unbound: Harv. J. Legal 
Left 65, 89 (2005). 
5 “POMO” is a short (and snarky) name for “postmodern.” A “POMO’d-out” theorist, in my mind, tends to 
take “positions that are bratty, disengaged, narcissistic, idiotically dedicated to puer senex performances of the 
enfant terrible.” Ian Halley, Queer Theory by Men, 11 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 7, 51 (2004) [hereinafter 
Queer Theory]. 
6 See Robin West, Desperately Seeking a Moralist, 29 Harv. J.L. & Gender 1, 43 (2006) (calling queer theory 
“rapeophilic”) [hereinafter Desperately Seeking]. Queer theorist Janet Halley notes the ad hominem nature of 
some of these critiques: “It has even been suggested that feminist internal critique harbors some sick personal 
investment in aggression and/or pathos or in sadism and/or masochism . . . , and opponents have lodged 
those criticisms as criticisms of me.” Janet Halley, Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from      
Feminism 313 (2006) [hereinafter Split Decisions]. 
7 Which I am also, at least in part (bi-racial Asian and White cisgender straight woman). Biddy Martin foresaw 
this potential for caricature in 1982: “Traditionally, feminists have been labelled prudish by those liberationists 
who would force them into a position for or against sex; there is a sense of urgency within the women’s 
movement now of the importance of developing our understanding of ‘sexuality’ so that we can move beyond 
these false alternatives and shift the focus of attention to the relations which have produced ‘sexuality’ as we 
know it.” Martin, supra note 3, at 11. 
8 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 321 (1984). 
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relativism or, worse, immorality where up is down. In this essay, I rely heavily on legal 
theorist Ian Halley’s provocative and paradigm-shifting intervention Queer Theory by Men 
[Queer Theory].9 Halley specifically identifies queer theory as a left/progressive project. 
Halley’s goal is to open the reader to the larger range of sex’s, even bad sex’s, political, 
physical, ontological, and epistemic meanings. In turn, legal theory and practice can better 
approach the “hard” decision of “what legal rule we want to use in the domain of sexual 
abuse—or even which political direction to go in.”10 Queer Theory’s postmodern moves of 
disorienting strongly held moral instincts and undermining presumptions are in the service, 
not of superior truth or playful intellectualism, but of social justice.11  
The cultural feminist (macramé) caricature is perhaps the most accurate, excepting 
the amateur botany. Cultural feminist writing forthrightly describes sex as it ought to be, in 
all its caring and hot splendor.12 This vision of sex graces countless self-help publications, 
sexual health surveys, glossy girl magazines, and campus student health publications.13 The 
notion that sex should be loving and intimate comports with preexisting gendered norms 
and “went down easy,” in Martha Chamallas’s words.14 These norms of “feminine” sex 
make rough, uncaring, and forceful encounters terrifying to the feminist, tantalizing to the 
sex radical, and habitual to the domineering man. To be sure, it is difficult to view the 
women-need-intimacy definition of sex as “truly belonging to women, because it has been 
men who have done the defining.”15 Nevertheless, fearing their vision is just too “vanilla,” 
                                                 
9 Queer Theory, supra note 5. Halley’s intervention in Queer Theory and later in Split Decisions, supra note 6, has 
proven so influential that it inspired a body of work on “feminism after” it. See, e.g., Brenda Cossman, 
Sexuality, Queer Theory, and “Feminism After”: Reading and Rereading the Sexual Subject, 49 McGill L.J. 
847 (2004); see also Lauren Berlant, Neither Monstrous nor Pastoral, but Scary and Sweet: Some Thoughts 
on Sex and Emotional Performance in Intimacies and What Do Gay Men Want?, 19 Women & Performance 
261 (2009). Halley wrote Queer Theory, self-consciously adopting a male identity, perspective, and name (Ian), 
and I will attribute the article to Ian, a man. Ian Halley’s iteration of queer theory is more political and            
prescriptive than Janet Halley’s later iteration in Split Decisions. See infra note 11. 
10 Queer Theory, supra, note 5, at 38.  
11 When Ian Halley wrote Queer Theory in 2004, he resisted the entrenched presumption of feminism’s unique 
and endless capacity to achieve a full, fair, and progressive politics of sexuality and endorsed “taking a break” 
from feminism to embrace queer theory. By the time Janet Halley wrote Split Decisions in 2006, she abandoned 
the argument that queer theory has more liberatory promise than feminism and instead endorsed a “politics 
of theoretic indeterminacy.” See Janet Halley writing sub nomine Ian Halley, Queer Theory by Men, in Feminist 
and Queer Legal Theory 9, 28 n.3 (Martha Albertson Fineman et al. eds., 2009). Nevertheless, the politics of 
theoretic indeterminacy is not a value-neutral exercise in intellectual onanism. This postmodern move also 
“holds out promise for intellectual, political and social revival of radical and critical practices.” Queer Theory, 
supra note 5, at 51. For Halley, accepting indeterminacy rather than rigid feminist orthodoxy produces “a 
disenchanted, coldly realist legal consciousness,” but such must be the “attitude of a responsible power 
wielder.” Split Decisions, supra note 6, at 304. Yet it also produces “a sense that legal rules can be decided 
not only by sober ethical mandate but with a thrilling will to power.” Id. 
12 Robin West, Caring for Justice 286-88 (1997). 
13 See, e.g., J.R. Thorpe, 7 Ways to Make Practicing Affirmative Consent Sexy, Bustle (Feb. 11, 2016) 
(https://www.bustle.com/articles/138297-7-ways-to-make-practicing-affirmative-consent-sexy). 
14 See Martha Chamallas, Past as Prologue: Old and New Feminisms, 17 Mich. J. Gender & L. 157, 162 (2010). 
15 Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1279, 1333 (1987). 
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cultural feminists make room for some risk-play within the love. Still, few feminists would 
accept the queer theory claim that ecstasy can be achieved through “dysphoric” penile 
penetration—that “[w]omen and gay men spread their legs with an unquenchable appetite 
for destruction.”16 
Today, dominance, cultural, and sex-positive positions are not neatly siloed. The 
feminist pro-sex and anti-sex lines have become so very blurred that there is a conflicted 
quality to the “feminist” view on sex. Young feminists celebrate norm-defying and exciting 
sex on the margins. At the same time, they proclaim that sex is traumatic assault without an 
affirmative and unambiguous expression of agreement.17 Activists claim the “slut” label, 
proudly marching nearly naked or in scanty S/M garb. At the same time, they condemn 
actual commercial sex as modern-day slavery.18 Feminist students at Stanford attend a Black 
Lives Matter rally on Monday and on Tuesday support higher sentences in sexual offenses 
because Brock Turner got off too lightly.19 College sexual misconduct offices produce 
messages and images dictating that boys protect girls from their, other men’s, or the girl’s 
own sexual inclinations. The posters are head-scratchers. How could any program that 
stems from feminist antirape sensibilities produce a pictorial of a stumbling drunk girl in a 
short red dress and ankle-breaking heels, hair spilling to conceal her face, leaning helplessly 
on a well-groomed, in-control boy, with the caption, “Just Because You Help Her Home 
Doesn’t Mean You Get To Help Yourself”? 
 
Figure 1. “Just Because” Ad Campaign.20 
                                                 
16 Leo Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave?, in AIDS: Cultural Analysis/Cultural Activism 197, 211 (Douglas 
Crimp ed., 1988).  
17 See Kristen Sollee, 4 Sexy Ways To Ask For Consent, Because It Can Be A Turn-On, Bustle, Oct. 16, 2015 
(https://www.bustle.com/articles/103236-4-sexy-ways-to-ask-for-consent-because-it-can-be-a-turn-on); 
Ezra Klein, “Yes Means Yes” Is A Terrible Law, and I Completely Support It, VOX, Oct. 13, 2014 (http://
www.vox.com/2014/10/13/6966847/yes-means-yes-is-a-terrible-bill-and-i-completely-support-it). 
18 Leora Tanenbaum, Topless Women at SlutWalk Demand Respect: Is This the Right Tactic?, Huffington 
Post, Oct. 5, 2011(http://www.huffingtonpost.com/leora-tanenbaum/topless-women-at-slutwalk_b_99 
3361.html). 
19 See Christopher Brennan, Stanford Students Protest Brock Turner Sentence, Sexual Assault on Campus 
During Graduation Ceremonies, Daily News, June 13, 2016 (http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ 
national/stanford-students-protest-rapist-brock-turner-graduation-article-1.2671260). 
20 Meagan Simon, Don’t Be That Guy, Sexual Assault Centre of Edmonton, Dec. 6, 2010 
(https://sacetalks.wordpress.com/2010/12/06/dont-be-that-guy/). 
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Will a “new direction” in queer theory help navigate this morass of rape fear, 
sexuality reclamation, empowerment through victimhood, sexual tolerance, zero tolerance, 
anti-incarceration sentiments, and rape-punishment fervor? For me, the old queer theory 
has all the ingredients necessary to speak meaningfully to this sex and rape-preoccupied 
moment. It questions presumptions about good and bad sex; it finds the hidden 
distributions of power; it distinguishes between law-as-written and law-in-action; and it 
shows that discourse can produce real effects, for better or worse. There is, however, one 
feature of queer theory—a contestable feature I will have to argue exists—that is not so 
helpful. An important presumption often unites feminist and queer accounts of sexuality, 
as well as their recent amalgamations: sex, relative to all other human activities, is something 
of great, or grave, importance.21 In this essay, I make the case that combining queer theory 
ingredients with a distinctly sex-indifferent stance brings a useful perspective to some of the 
thornier aspects of the contemporary debate over sex regulation and reform. 
In the #MeToo era, we can see all too clearly how sex has an outsized influence on 
policy and public debate. Raging against sexual harm has become the preferred weapon of 
feminists and others trying to attack heterogenous power differentials. Focusing on sex, 
advocates wage proxy wars for other values, from equality in professor-grad student 
relationships to labor protection and gender diversity on corporate boards. The social 
prerogative to avoid bad and have good sex has engendered public health and other 
institutional bureaucracies in the business of managing danger and pleasure.22 And in the 
ultimate insult to sex radicals, bureaucrats reconfigure the absence of danger as pleasure.23  
There is a deeply entrenched belief that sex is inherently more important than other 
forms of human labor, other endorphin-producing physical actions, and other human 
interactions that risk disease, injury, and pregnancy.24 Diverse societies from antiquity have 
singled out sex, investing it with a mythologic character in culture, art, and various social 
practices. Postmodern and queer theorists have long wrestled with the question of 
sexuality’s salience and the implications of its oversignificance. As Michel Foucault 
observed in Volume One of The History of Sexuality, “Under the authority of a language that 
had been carefully expurgated so that it was no longer directly named, sex was taken charge 
of, tracked down as it were, by a discourse that aimed to allow it no obscurity, no respite.”25 
                                                 
21 Of course, there are numerous queer and feminist theories and writings that have nothing to do with sex at 
all, although I would argue that both categories of theorizing are generally more sex-preoccupied than other 
schools of philosophy, such as liberalism, aesthetics, and ethics.  
22 Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 Cal. L. Rev. 881, 924-25 (2016). 
23 Where is Your Line: Consent is Sexy!, U. Wyo. (http://www.uwyo.edu/stop/resources/10_stop 
_consent_sexy_booklet.pdf) (last visited Oct. 24, 2016). The booklet is no longer available online. See also 
Gersen & Suk, supra note 22, at 928-29 for more examples.  
24 Gayle S. Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in Pleasure and 
Danger, supra note 1, at 143, 150 (“[T]he exercise of erotic capacity, intelligence, curiosity, or creativity all 
require pretexts that are unnecessary for other pleasures, such as the enjoyment of food, fiction, or                    
astronomy.”). 
25 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume I: An Introduction 20 (Robert Hurley trans., 1978). 
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Relatedly, in Thinking Sex, Gayle S. Rubin critiqued “sex essentialism,” the idea that sex is 
“eternally unchanging, asocial, and transhistorical,” and the “fallacy of the misplaced scale” 
where “everything pertaining to sex has been a ‘special case’ in our culture.”26 
Queer theorists frequently object to the aggrandizement of sex by feminists, 
conservatives, and moralists seeking to control deviancy. Rubin engaged in a critical 
examination of the laws and cultural mores that place sex on a pedestal and the symbiotic 
and sustaining relationship between repressive regulation and sexual significance. She urged 
the reader to see past the law-versus-libido construction of most sexual liberation 
arguments. Instead, she maintained, we should be keenly aware of how the law creates 
privileged and minoritized sexual classes and practices. Still, for all its warnings about sex’s 
outsized meaning, Thinking Sex meticulously catalogues how law and society imbue deviant 
sexual practices with special negative meaning, leading to repression. Far less attention is paid 
to the flip side of the coin—the compulsory sexuality of “privileged” sex actors.  
The picture of sex that emerges from the feminism-versus-queer theory debate 
alternates between a risk of utter devastation and an opportunity for Freudian ecstasy. In 
reality, the lion’s share of sex is, well, banal. Rubin, like many queer theorists, critiques the 
negative significance attributed to sex, arguing that in twentieth-century American culture, 
“Sex is presumed guilty until proven innocent.” Rubin offers as evidence the DSM—“a 
fairly reliable map of the current moral hierarchy of sexual activities”—which in the 1980s 
listed “fetishism, sadism, masochism, transsexuality, [and] transvestism” as “disorders.” But 
fast-forward to 2002. Sex researchers Hart and Wellings argued in the British Medical Journal 
that the “medicalisation model” replaced the “orthodoxy” of “restraint and moderation in 
sexual matters” with the mandate for “more and better sexual gratification”:  
[T]he medicalisation of sexual behaviour has extended most recently into the domain of 
sexual pleasure. Doctors are wheeled in to place sex at the centre of a healthy lifestyle, and 
articles peppered with physiological and technical terms confirm and elaborate on the right 
way to perform “to please him or her.” Men and women are encouraged to protract their 
sexually active lives, regardless of desire.27 
The authors close with the rumination that compulsory sexuality may well be the modern 
iteration of Herbert Marcuse’s “tyranny of genital sexuality.”  
Writings that assume sex’s banality, ordinariness, and instrumentality are bit players 
in the feminism-versus-queer theory play. Queer theorists rightly worry about sex’s status 
as a site of concentrated danger, but we can also turn a skeptical eye toward its status as a 
site of concentrated pleasure.28 Compulsory sexuality certainly tyrannizes many groups in 
contemporary society—incels, asexuals, the menopausal, teenage boys, and indeed singles. 
                                                 
26 Rubin, supra note 24, at 150-51. 
27 Graham Hart & Kaye Wellings, Sexual Behaviour and Its Medicalisation: In Sickness and in Health, 324 
BMJ 896, 898 (2002). 
28 See Joseph J. Fischel & Hilary R. O’Connell, Disabling Consent, or Reconstructing Sexual Autonomy, 30 
Colum. J. Gender & L. 428, 525 (2016) (advancing a “claim for the ordinariness, not the extraordinariness, of 
sex”). 
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However, my main point, developed below, is that the feminist-queer theory debate has 
contributed to a dialogue in which the anxieties and controversies of the day are repackaged 
as sexual controversies, obscuring important stakes.29 When we have our sex blinders on, it 
is difficult to seek remedies to—or even see—the problems for which sexual harm stood 
in as a proxy. In the next section, I look at the dominance feminism-queer theory debate 
over sex, specifically referencing MacKinnon and Halley. From that debate, I assemble an 
analytical toolkit to help navigate the murky waters of sex regulation and reform in this sex-
preoccupied era. The final section offers some formative thoughts on how a queer 
theoretical and sex-indifferent approach sheds light on contemporary controversies, 
specifically on the Avital Ronell case. 
 
II. A Play in Two Acts: Feminist Pain and Queer Pleasure 
Sexual acts are burdened with an excess of significance. 
Gayle S. Rubin30 
The seeds of queer theory were planted during the infamous “sex wars” of the 1970s when 
feminist reformers agitated for strict anti-pornography laws. Feminists waged bruising 
scholarly, political, and personal battles with sex radicals, who worried that the anti-porn 
regime mainstreamed and conservatized feminism, instantiated heteronormativity, stymied 
women’s sexual self-understanding, and thwarted sexual liberation.31 In understanding this 
clash, from which queer theory partially sprang, a good place to start is with dominance 
feminism, the first act.32 
A. Act 1: Dominance Feminism 
Dominance feminism offers a “structural” account of social power, involving a “patriarchy” 
that gravitationally pulls apparently autonomous liberal actors toward a male-dominant 
order.33 In the early 1980s, the theory intervened in the two prevailing views of female 
empowerment: be the same as men or be different from men. Objecting to the liberal 
feminist idea of equal treatment, MacKinnon stated, “For each of [men’s] differences from 
women, what amounts to an affirmative action plan is in effect, otherwise known as the 
structure and values of American society.”34 Cultural feminists’ imperative to embrace 
                                                 
29 See infra Part III. 
30 Rubin, supra note 24, at 151. 
31 See generally Pleasure and Danger, supra note 1. 
32 The sex wars were, of course, not the only genesis of queer theory. Postmodern theorizing on sexuality, for 
example, Foucault, supra note 25, and gay-liberationist agitation in the wake of AIDS panic also contributed 
significantly. 
33 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 
Signs 635 (1983) [hereinafter Feminist Jurisprudence]. 
34 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law 45 (1987) [hereinafter        
Discourses].  
Gruber — Sex Wars 109 
 
women’s difference was similarly fraught. So long as the patriarchy has its “foot [on] our 
necks,” MacKinnon opined, we can never really know “in what tongue women speak.”35 
Dominance feminism had epistemological ambitions, insisting that patriarchy is subject-
forming. The identity “woman,” MacKinnon insisted, cannot be separated from traits that 
evolved in a primordial soup of male dominance.36 
 These features of dominance feminism are analogous to portions of Immanuel 
Kant’s metaphysical philosophy. The analogy is helpful to see how, in contrast to Kantian 
consistency, dominance feminism vacillates between transcendental and empirical 
deduction and between insisting on trans-human conditions of cognition and claiming 
access to “true” consciousness. Kant similarly posits a priori conditions of human cognition 
or “synthesis.”37 For Kant, there is an authentic truth, a philosophical necessity, a “thing in 
itself,” but, by definition, it is unknowable to humans. Humans must necessarily cognize 
the world in terms of time and space.38 They must necessarily adhere to certain 
“categories”—rules of reasoning involving quantity, quality, relation, and modality that 
make the cognition of objects possible.39 Kant derives these conditions of human thought 
through “transcendental deduction,” not empirical observation about human understanding.40 
He assumes the reader will be inclined to agree to his foundational principles about human 
perception, i.e., that there are trans-human conditions of perception. Kant’s deduction succeeds 
in no small part because of the challenge to conceptualize objects outside of time and space. 
Just try it.41 
Dominance feminism at times makes grand claims about human synthesis.42 It 
argues that humans are insensible outside of gender and identifies trans-human rules of 
patriarchal logic that distinguish women from men.43 Even those with earnest non-
                                                 
35 Id. at 36. 
36 Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 33, at 636 n.3 (“Because [the male view] is the dominant point of view 
and defines rationality, women are pushed to see reality in its terms, although this denies their vantage point 
as women in that it contradicts (at least some of) their lived experience. Women who adopt the male           
standpoint are passing, epistemologically speaking. This is not uncommon and is rewarded.”). 
37 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (J.M.D. Meiklejohn trans., Colonial Press, 1900) (1781). 
38 Id. at 21-42, 279. 
39 Id. at 93-96. 
40 Id. at 68-69; see also Derk Pereboom, Kant’s Transcendental Arguments, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Spring 2018 (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/kant-transcendental/). 
41 I note that this essay has no ambitions as a philosophical disquisition on Kant. 
42 See Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 33, at 636 n.3 (“The intractability of maleness as a form of 
dominance suggests that social constructs, although they flow from human agency, can be less plastic than 
nature has proven to be. If experience trying to do so is any guide, it may be easier to change biology than 
society.”). 
43 Like Kant’s view of time and space, MacKinnon views gender as a human construct. Unlike Kant, as we 
will see, MacKinnon’s account equivocates between the view of gender as an a priori and trans-human           
prerequisite of cognition and a socially constructed framework that can be discarded under the right, albeit 
limited, political and discursive conditions. 
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patriarchal beliefs, like “women are the smarter sex,” form them with the background 
presumption that there is “woman” who has certain characteristics—characteristics dictated 
by patriarchy.44 MacKinnon’s transcendental deduction has some appeal. Seeing people as 
genderless does not come naturally. And yet, cognizing a genderless subject is infinitely 
easier than conceptualizing objects outside of time and space. Halley, for example, is 
unpersuaded that the trans-human sex/gender construct is “intractabl[e],” “universal,” and 
“less plastic than nature,”45 as MacKinnon opines, instead offering a Foucauldian-discourse 
account of its origins.46  
 At other times, dominance feminism adopts Kant’s rival David Hume’s approach 
of finding phenomena in the world.47 When we “look into the world,”48 we do see 
innumerable examples of the objective standard being the male standard, of gender being 
presumed as natural and inevitable, of women and men understanding themselves in terms 
of patriarchal logic. Nonetheless, Duncan Kennedy calls such a structuralist account 
“paranoid” because it assumes that the patriarchy has a consistent, intractable internal logic 
and is constantly reconfiguring itself to keep women down.49 But even the paranoid version 
of the patriarchy, viewed within the long arc of history, seems plausible. Patriarchy in its 
broadest form is credible as an ontological and cognitive prior.  
 MacKinnon, however, makes a definitional move that undercuts the inherent 
persuasiveness of the ubiquitous patriarchy theory. She defines patriarchy solely by 
reference to women’s sexual subordination by men.50 This transforms dominance feminism 
into a much more specific claim: that the sexual dominator-subordinate relationship defines 
men and women. The general idea of patriarchy was abstract enough to permit a reader to 
invest it with whatever she saw in the world. If the claim is, “Neutral standards are simply 
the male standard,” it is easy for an observer to gather everyday evidence of it, from sports 
and literature to business. However, once dominance feminism narrowed patriarchy to 
sexual subordination, it became quite a bit less intuitive.  
                                                 
44 Kant, supra note 37, at 637. 
45 See supra notes 36 & 42; see also Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 33, at 636 n.8 (“[N]o woman escapes 
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47 See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (P.H. Nidditch & L.A. Selby-Bigge eds., 2d ed. 1978) (1739-
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48 Queer Theory, supra note 5, at 48. 
49 Duncan Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing and the Eroticization of Domination, 26 New Eng. L. Rev. 
1309, 1338 (1992) [hereinafter Sexy Dressing]. 
50 See A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 109 & passim (1989) [hereinafter Feminist 
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Even one sympathetic to the ubiquitous patriarchy account could find evidence that 
women’s oppression is not coextensive with sexual harm but is contextual and 
overdetermined.51 Wendy Brown observes that the sexual subordination account ignores:  
[T]he privatization and pervasive feminization of reproductive work; a gendered division 
of labor predicated on the exchange between household labor and socialized production; 
gendered religious, political, and civic codes; and other sharply gendered spheres of activity 
and social norms—in short, all elements of the construction of gender that are 
institutionalized, hence enforced, elsewhere than through the organization of desire.52 
Brown asserts that MacKinnon’s own preoccupation with sex and pornography aligned 
with larger social trends. Pornography and its emphasis on heterosexual male domination 
was patriarchy’s crisis effort “to shore up or stabilize a sexual/gender dominance itself 
destabilized by the erosions of other elements of gender subordination in the late twentieth 
century.”53 MacKinnon’s fixation on this system of heterosexual sexual dominance as 
constitutive of gender was less a response to than a reflection of this move: “MacKinnon’s 
theory of gender unwittingly consolidate[d] gender out of symptoms of a crisis moment in 
male dominance.”54 The paranoid structuralist would say that dominance feminism is an 
example of the devilish way patriarchy perpetuates itself.  
Women looked at their worlds and did not see sex and subordination as co-
extensive. They found sexual pleasure and erotic interest in male-dominant sex. LGBTQ 
theorists saw sex wholly unrelated to male-female subordination. In response, MacKinnon 
retreated to transcendental logic: women who view sex as something other than oppression 
suffer from patriarchal consciousness. But recall that dominance feminism’s transcendental 
deduction held that all beliefs are constituted by patriarchy. There is no outside or 
exceptional inside. This would indicate that dominance feminism’s epistemological 
intervention runs out at the descriptive—that patriarchal logic is. Mackinnon indeed once 
recognized the paradox of false consciousness as the fundamental challenge to the feminist 
enterprise:  
[I]f both feminism and antifeminism are responses to the condition of women, how is 
feminism exempt from devalidation by the same account? . . . The false consciousness 
approach begs this question by taking women’s self-reflections as evidence of their stake 
in their own oppression, when the women whose self-reflections are at issue question 
whether their condition is oppressed at all. The second response proceeds as if women are 
free. Or, at least, as if we have considerable latitude to make, or to choose, the meanings if 
not the determinants of our situation. . . . Thus, the first approach is one-sidedly outside 
when there is no outside, the second one-sidedly inside when someone (probably a woman) 
is inside everything . . . . So our problem is this: the false consciousness approach cannot 
explain experience as it is experienced by those who experience it. The alternative can only 
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reiterate the terms of that experience. This is only one way in which the object/subject split 
is fatal to the feminist enterprise.55  
But MacKinnon wanted to move past the “unwillingness, central to feminism, to dismiss 
some women as simply deluded while granting other women the ability to see the truth,” 
so she tucked the paradox away. Dominance feminists proceeded to make the in-the-word-
case for sexual subordination thesis “without an account of [their] capacity to do so or to 
imagine or realize a more whole truth.” Given that the subordination-is-sex thesis did not 
have intuitive appeal, such a case would have to be solid. Perhaps it could come in the form 
of a Foucauldian dialectic and genealogical account or a Marxian transhistorical “science of 
domination” analysis. Instead, dominance feminists’ in-the-world case consisted of an 
excruciatingly detailed, if anecdotal, laundry list of sexual horrors men inflict upon women. 
It also pointed to the very constitution of female bodies as smoking-gun evidence that 
gender is synonymous with sexual subordination. Andrea Dworkin argued, “The slit 
between [a woman’s] legs . . . which means entry into her—intercourse—appears to be the 
key to women’s lower human status.”56 Wendy Brown observes that dominance feminism 
ended up with a “strikingly nonhistorical and nondialectical account of antagonistic social 
dynamics constitutive of an apprehensible social totality.”57 
It comes as no surprise then that dominance feminism’s case failed to persuade 
many of the “gender = patriarchy = sexual subordination” equation. In defending against 
naysayers, MacKinnon dusted off “false consciousness,” transforming it from a 
transcendental truism into a selectively invoked trump card. An opponent’s assertion of 
pleasure or non-pain in domination, no matter the strength of their evidence or argument, 
is presumptively suspect.58 As cultural feminist Robin West argued, “[W]omen have a 
seemingly endless capacity to lie, both to ourselves and others, about what gives us pain 
and what gives us pleasure.”59 By contrast, woke feminists have access to Kant’s 
unknowable “thing in itself” because “living a subordinated status can give one access to 
its reality.”60 They have license to proceed with scant evidence and maintain the sex-as-
subordination stance a fortiori. Halley points out this inconsistency:  
[MacKinnon] retained the structural view of male domination: it is horizonless; it produces 
men and women; it relates them to each other in gender, which is eroticized domination. 
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But by the mid-1980s she claimed to know many, many things, and to know them because 
women’s point of view had disclosed them to her without distortion. Rape, sexual 
harassment, domestic abuse, pornography—all the lurid catalog of sexual nastiness—these 
are the core elements in male domination. Rights against them enforced by the state would 
be feminist. Women who disagree with any part of this line, MacKinnon was willing to 
suggest, have been co-opted by male consciousness.61 
The belief that dominance feminist views of sex are necessarily true, despite their formation 
under patriarchy, is not transcendental deduction, but transcendental faith. MacKinnon’s 
move from the metaphysical-human cognition divide to the argument that she has access 
to things in themselves, made her less a Kantian than a spiritual prophet. Religious gurus 
familiarly start by claiming there are epistemic limits on humans’ access to the true 
metaphysical nature of things, just as Kant did. But they follow up by declaring that a 
privileged few have direct access to the “truth” through a special relationship with God. 
This is a time-tested method of entrenching the ideology of the few, even when inconsistent 
with the experiences of the many. 
 The final dominance feminist move is normative. Its characterization of the world 
as rife with horrific sexual subordination morphed seamlessly into a moral imperative of 
zero tolerance for harmful sex, its participants, and its defenders. Dominance feminists, in 
turn, supported law reform to address feckless state regulation of sexual assault, 
prostitution, and pornography.62 In this view, rights are not protections against an 
oppressive government, but guarantees to police or other regulatory enforcement against 
men. This sat uneasily with dominance feminism’s claim that the state is the embodiment 
of male domination.63 Like the carve-out for true consciousness, feminists carved out a 
domain of patriarchy-free state authority—the state authority they supported.  
 Dominance feminists appeared to have an abiding faith that laws directed against 
sexual harms would produce their intended results. Many held without reservation that 
commercial sex regulation would necessarily reduce sexual abuse, rather than rendering 
sexual labor riskier or decreasing commercial sex but increasing rape. For this group, there 
was little tolerance for the legal realist insight that “rules governing sexual abuse are 
embedded in noisy enforcement systems” which produce intended, anticipated, 
unintended, and unanticipated consequences.64 Its intent-equals-effect conception of law 
ran up against the critique that “the real action is not in law per se, but in wildly differently 
interested players who participate in wildly complex social interactions, calibrating their own 
activities according to their perception of the balance of punishments, immunities and 
deterrence that the rules, as enforced, happen to produce.”65 But dominance feminism, 
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using transcendental logic, simply synonymized leniency and patriarchy. Every instance of 
under-enforcement was gender injustice. Law enforcement then became, not a tool whose 
use in dismantling patriarchy required careful consideration, but necessary in itself. As Halley 
puts it, dominance feminists treated “law as a prohibition or a right that is vindicated in 
some sense merely by existing.”66  
Dominance feminist agitation, as a consequence, became virtually indistinguishable 
from moralist anti-sex activism. It advocated reform to address an ideologically defined sex 
“problem” with little evidence on how law would solve it. Activists strategically collected 
and presented evidence to support their foregone conclusions about sex and law. 
Dominance feminism’s moral imperative to fight patriarchy also moved its adherents to 
demonize anyone not with the program.67 Vance argues:  
Like religious orthodoxy, political ideology about sexual behavior contrasts lofty goals with 
gritty, or fleshy, reality, exhorting individuals to strive against the odds for perfection. Falls 
from grace may be tolerated for those who continue to believe; thus, actual practice can 
become quite discrepant from theoretically desired behavior, without posing any challenge 
to the empirical or logical foundations of sexual ideology. The ideology functions to set up 
new social categories and maintain strict boundaries between them: the good and the bad, 
believer and infidel.68 
Even victims can slide into the category of patriarchy conspirators when they fail to act 
against perpetrators. One activist remarked in 1987, “When the sex war is won, prostitutes 
should be shot as collaborators for their terrible betrayal of all women.”69 Dominance 
feminism’s radical message to pay close attention to the ever-shifting and complex 
operation of patriarchal power in various legal and nonlegal arrangements was and remains 
eclipsed by its punitive anti-sex program.  
B. Act 2: Queer Theory 
Halley locates queer theory in the sex-radical, sex-positive, LGBTQ responses to 
dominance feminist theory and its sex regulatory practice.70 Halley observes: 
Where identity, subordination and moralism come under left critique, we find a rich brew 
of pro-gay, sex liberationist, gay-male, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and sex-practice-
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based sex-radical, sex-positive, anti-male/female model, anti-cultural-feminist political 
engagements, some more postmodernizing than others, some feminist, others not. The 
term “queer theory” is often invoked to describe this complex array of projects.71 
Dominance feminists adopted a fixed view of sex and an ambition-equals-effect legal 
agenda. Sex radicals sought to destabilize this fixed view and scrutinize how top-down 
criminal and onerous regulatory laws affect sexual minorities, women involved in 
commercial sex, and marginalized sexual practices. Sex radicals emphasized sexual pleasure 
over sexual pain. They argued that sexual harm should not hold a monopoly on feminist 
attention, and feminist energy should be diverted toward understanding and fostering 
female sexual pleasure.72 Gay identity politics also played a role in the sex radical response. 
LGBTQ critics objected to dominance feminism’s construction of gender in terms of 
heterosexual sex dynamics and its impugning of gay sex and gay sexual imagery.  
 The LGBTQ position was itself heterodox. Some lesbians adopted a cultural 
feminist perspective that egalitarian, loving, lesbian sex should be the exemplar for all sex—
gay and straight alike—and supported the feminist anti-porn program.73 This alienated 
other lesbians who resented the politicization and essentialist stereotyping of their 
sexuality.74 LGBTQ activists pointed out that the dominance feminist activism robustly 
engaged in the discourse of sexual “deviance,” something that had long terrorized sexual 
minorities. As Alice Echols reminds us, at the height of the sex wars in 1980, NOW passed 
a resolution “to ensure that NOW does not work with any groups which might misconstrue 
pornography, s/m, cross-generational sex and public sex as ‘Lesbian Rights issues.’”75 Some 
lesbian separatists called for a more radical expulsion of male sexuality from feminist 
theorizing and berated straight anti-porn feminists as “cocksuckers.”76 Halley notes that gay 
identity politics tended toward “either a MacKinnon-like form, looking with a wary eye for 
traces everywhere of heterosexual dominance and seeking its overthrow; or a cultural-
feminist-like form, emphasizing the moral virtues of homosexuals and seeking their 
normative inclusion in the center.”77 Queer Theory sought to move past the gay-rights 
moralism of subordinated identity politics and idealized sexuality.  
  Queer Theory reiterates MacKinnon’s structural caution that power hides silently and 
invisibly in neutral standards and “autonomous” choice. However, it rejects MacKinnon’s 
a priori presumption of gender, especially in its specific form as heterosexual male-on-female 
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sexual dominance.78 It further endorses Duncan Kennedy’s legal realist insight that it is 
impossible to accurately map the power ripples when law is dropped into a complex social-
sexual system. In his article Sexy Dressing, Kennedy laid out a detailed diagnostic of 
workplace sex, involving complicated calculations of desire and self-interest, executed 
under diverse power differentials, communicated through contested, hard-to-interpret 
signals.79 Reform to intervene in the abusive aspects of this system with its shifting authority 
and opaque semiosis is therefore complicated work, making the a priori identification of 
sexual abuse and faith in the law particularly dangerous.  
 Another insight from Queer Theory is that discourse, including left/feminist 
discourse, impacts the meaning people attribute to sex and thus their experience of it. The 
article ruminates on the “wrongs inflicted on the tremulous human spirit by the feminist 
discourse of sexual truth.”80 Feminism produces harm, the argument goes, by establishing 
a necessary relationship between un-feminist sex and trauma. Imagine a college student 
whose previous engagement in get-it-over-with, dominating, or otherwise imperfect sex did 
not particularly trouble her. She reads feminist texts in class and comes to believe that she 
should reinterpret her past sexual experiences as harmful and life-altering. This student’s 
consciousness has been raised, and she now has a less transgressive and more anxious 
relationship with sex. 
 This type of consciousness-raising, involving the reinterpretation of bad sex as deep 
harm and social injustice, has recently become a mainstay of the college bureaucracy. In 
2015, Title IX administrators at the University of Colorado constructed a sexual assault 
survey “to fill gaps in our understanding of the frequency and types of sexual misconduct 
experienced by CU-Boulder students.”81 That survey classified as sexual assault acts ranging 
from anal penetration at gunpoint to stolen kisses. Unsurprisingly, it found that one third 
of freshman women had experienced sexual assault. In this and other surveys, the vast 
majority of “sexual assault” victims per survey definitions—90% in the CU survey—
respond that they did not report or otherwise seek official intervention. In the CU Survey, 
the number one reason was “did not think it was serious enough to report.”82  
 I asked one of the survey authors why the instrument adopted broad definitions 
that evidently did not match up with students’ existing constructions of sexual assault. She 
explained that the instrument was designed to serve an “educational function” and teach 
students about what they should classify as sex assault. Indeed, the sheer volume of “not 
serious enough to report” responses did not move the administration to rethink its broad 
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definitions, but instead produced bureaucratic “action items”: “[C]orrecting misperceptions 
about the seriousness of sexual misconduct issues through educational campaigns” and 
increasing “recognition of what constitutes sexual assault (‘Just Because’ campaign).”83  
 Halley’s rumination that feminists’ “discursive production of pain may well also 
produce the subjects who experience it; that feminism may be responsible for at least some 
of the trauma that real women really experience in their real lives,”84 drew a strong response. 
Robin West fired back, “[T]he injury of rape is done by rapists, not texts, and is done to the 
jawbone, the pelvis, the reproductive organs, the stomach, the skin, the eyes, the vaginal 
walls, the anus, and the psyche.”85 Of course, pleasurable, hotly desired, carefully negotiated 
sex can injure vaginal walls, just as fun nonsexual physical activities can cause pain. 
Moreover, women and men are constrained and compelled by various cultural norms and 
hierarchies to engage in nonsexual labor that physically exhausts the body—going into labor 
comes to mind.  
 For many feminists, power, consent, and social meaning, not injury, mark the line 
between permissible and unacceptable sex. In this account, sex is more harmful to women 
than men, and imperfect sex is more harmful than imperfect nonsexual interactions because 
culture and discourse have made it so. Now, this is not invariably true, and both Halley and 
Kennedy recognize that social mores produce sexual anxiety bordering on terror in some 
men. Nevertheless, the following gendered scenario is all too familiar: Two college students 
have sex while extremely drunk. The next day, the boy’s friends say, “Hey, do you realize 
you had sex with her last night?” He replies, “No—that’s awesome!” The girl’s friends say, 
“Hey, do you realize he had sex with you last night?” She replies, “No—that’s awful!” The 
sex is the same, but the meaning varies by gender.86 Yet this recognition that sex is 
historically, traditionally, and patriarchally constructed as innately bad for women 
underscores the need for caution in promoting the sex-equals-female-trauma narrative. 
Even if feminist prohibitionist laws succeed in seriously leveling down the volume of sex 
in society, the distribution of sex-value and sex-harm will remain gender imbalanced—an 
imbalance aggravated by feminist discourse of trauma. Drucilla Cornell cautions, 
“Feminism, particularly in the complex area of sexuality, demands that we live with the 
paradox that we are trying to break the bonds of the meanings that have made us who we 
are as women.”87 
 Perhaps this is why West, like Dworkin, retreats to biology in construing women’s 
presumptively risky relationship to sex. If physical “invasion,” rather than psychological 
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interpretation, is the root of sexual harm, one can maintain an anti-sex stance without 
worrying about contributing to women’s culturally cultivated dread of imperfect sex. But 
the biology-invasion view of sexual harm carries its own dangers. This account of sex is a 
mainstay of conservative anti-contraception, anti-abortion discourse. For example, 
President Trump’s deputy director of Health and Human Services, Teresa Manning, 
infamously stated, “The effects of abortion are very similar to the effects of rape.”88 One 
interpretation is that Manning was referencing the psychological effects of abortion. Jeannie 
Suk Gersen has traced the narrative overlap between feminists’ sex-trauma arguments and 
conservatives’ abortion-trauma arguments.89 Another gloss is that Manning was talking 
about the physical invasion of the vagina. In this view, whether by genitals or objects, 
penetration is women’s ruination. Criminal codes throughout the country severely punish 
nonconsensual or forcible vaginal penetration without similar penalties for nonconsensual 
or forcible “envelopment” of the penis. 
 Nevertheless, Queer Theory, at times, appears to also endorse the Dworkinian view 
of penetration as sui generis. In the reading of Leo Bersani’s Is the Rectum a Grave?, Halley is 
most post-modern, flipping the pleasure-plain dichotomy into a pleasure-pain dyad. Bersani 
acceded to dominance feminism’s truism that “to be penetrated is to abdicate power.”90 
However, in opposition to feminism’s value judgments, he saw sex’s “ineradicable 
aspects”—its “anticommunal, antiegalitarian, antinurturing, antiloving” nature—as 
“reasons for defending, for cherishing the very sex [feminists] find so hateful.”91 Bersani 
drew on Freudian psychoanalytic theory to explain why. Selfhood, he argued, involves the 
“shifting experience that every human being has of his or her body’s capacity, or failure, to 
control and to manipulate the world beyond the self.”92 Only through sexual penetration 
can a person reach “a certain threshold of intensity . . . when the organization of the self is 
momentarily disturbed by sensations or affective processes somehow ‘beyond’ those 
connected with psychic organization”93—or, as Halley put it, “experience the unspeakable 
thrill of encountering our own metaphysical and experiential dissolution.”94 Bersani 
accepted dominance feminism’s transcendental deduction but flipped its moral imperative: 
“not bad but good.”95 
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 What are we to take from Halley’s endorsement of Bersani’s account of desire? Is 
it queer theory’s discourse of sexual truth? If so, this truth also has potential to inflict grave 
wrongs on “the tremulous human spirit.”96 Halley indeed warned that “critical 
disorientation” about dominating sex and the loss of one’s “moral compass” might well be 
an “unaffordable luxury.”97 Robin West characterized this POMO intervention as not just 
unaffordable, but treacherous for women. Halley, she said, “fantasized [a] ‘rapeophile’ 
society: plenty of violent but harmless sex, imposed regardless of want or desire on the part 
of she who would be raped, and all of it then metaphorically rhapsodized.”98 Mark 
Spindleman found the queer line of reasoning even more alarming: “[T]he ideology of 
sexual freedom entails a right to die for sex and also a right to kill in its name.”99 Halley did 
not rhapsodize all violent sex but admitted that much of it produces pain and harm to the 
penetrated person. Nevertheless, Halley appreciated that Bersani “redeem[ed] for euphoria” 
some of this “dysphoric” sex.100  
 Halley, point in fact, made the startling admission that “it [is] very difficult for queer 
theory to ‘know’ how to distinguish rape from habitual, Sunday afternoon, missionary 
position, marital intercourse.”101 Before anyone gets too upset, let me add that Halley said 
that we nonetheless must decide on good and bad sex, on what to and not to regulate, 
“under the inevitable condition of not knowing.”102 Acknowledging the possibility of pleasure 
in sexual abjection, Halley argued, fosters sexual decision-making with “a wider scope of 
political sympathies” than the narrow dominance feminist view permits.103 “There is both 
strength and danger in framing [such] possibilities,” Halley ruminated. “Only if we articulate 
and explore them, will we ever look into the world and see if it matches them.”104 In this 
reading, the emphasis on Bersani upends, rather than establishes, sexual truth. Flipping the 
moral meaning of MacKinnon’s description of sex has synergy with the anti-subordination 
goal of protecting marginalized sexual actors from intrusive government regulation. As 
Carol Vance notes, the feminist presumption that sex is “guilty until proven innocent,” is 
an “expensive” presumption given how easily sex provokes “negative sanctions.”105  
 Given that queer theory originated in part as a political and adaptive response to 
intense, brutal, and unjustified government repression, it is no wonder that queer texts often 
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read as redemptive, even pastoral, manifestos on marginalized—indeed demonized—
sexuality. Lauren Berlant observed, “The optimism of queer will rides the waves of the 
power of phantasy-in-practice to subvert the foreclosures sought by dominant institutions 
and norms.”106 Queer Theory’s descriptions of penetration and gay male pleasure exhibit this 
pastoral quality. Halley rightly warned about the costs of law and culture disciplining society 
toward a universal “infantile, lesbian, entirely feminine sexuality.”107 Nevertheless, Queer 
Theory often appears to counterbalance this vision with another universal truism—that 
penetration-abjection is the only avenue through which humans can experience the 
“‘jouissance of exploded limits.’”108  
 It thus makes sense that theorists like Spindleman read queer theory’s 
phenomenological account of sex much like I do MacKinnon’s. Spindleman argued that in 
queer theory, “sex is re-imagined as prior to the social world, including its values and 
institutions . . . . In the forest’s fresh air, sex, unrestrained, must be allowed to be what it is, 
found in its becoming, unknown and unknowable before it is.”109 Spindleman seethed 
against the vision of a queer-theoretic sex-supremacist society in which dysphoric sex has 
near religious importance: 
Sex in this account is the value of all values. But, importantly, not because it is good. . . . 
The ideology of sexual freedom does not herald sex because it expresses affection or caring 
or nurturing or compassion, much less because of how it builds or affirms friendship, 
community—or love. Sex’s value is [as] an awesome power that commands esteem because 
it is selfish and wasteful and degenerate and wicked and violent and cruel and irresponsible 
and criminal.110  
Queer Theory’s stated aim is disruptive—to counter the dominant (and dominance) feminist 
view of penetration-abjection, not to establish sex as a “value of values.” And yet, Halley’s 
claims go beyond simply denying the essentialist penetration-equals-trauma narrative. 
Disrupting the dominance feminist frame with the in-the-world observation that people 
have a range of feelings about sexual domination from trauma to jouissance is one thing. 
Claiming that domination is the key to the highest Freudian heights is fully another. Halley 
further intimates that penetration-abjection is the path to authentic egalitarianism—a self 
that is untethered from gender, race, age, class, and other attributes. Halley’s optimism 
about queer theory’s liberationist potential feels constructivist, as if it, rather than feminism, 
always had the key to the castle of sexual justice.  
 Within a few years of writing Queer Theory, Halley came to regard such optimism as 
“a profound error in intellectual and political strategy.” Halley became “more skeptical and 
critical” of queer theory’s “utopian possibilities” and instead embraced a “politics of 
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theoretic indeterminacy.”111 Nevertheless—and here my argument is admittedly aesthetic 
and penumbral—the sheer number of words Queer Theory and its later iterations devote to 
transforming the pleasure-pain dichotomy into a dyad leaves the reader with the distinct 
impression that the alternative to dominance feminism’s “truth” that unloving penetration 
equals rape is queer theory’s truth that unloving penetration equals rapture. The latter truth 
can also produce real harm in the form of subjects who lament their failure to experience 
or who unwisely seek out sexual domination and policies that poorly calibrate the costs and 
benefits of eroticizing domination. 
III. The Finale: A Sex-Indifferent Truce in the Proxy War 
Celibacy is the new deviance. 
Graham Hart & Kaye Wellings112 
A. Sex Indifference in Theory 
Halley uses the tools of queer theory—following diffuse power, shifting the frame, 
recognizing law’s “noisy” enforcement, and tracing the relationship between discourse and 
reality—to disrupt dominance feminism’s carceral stranglehold on sexual theorizing. I want 
to use these tools, but with a sex-indifferent gloss, to work through contemporary 
controversies and highlight the costs of the left increasingly using sex to fight proxy wars 
for other values. To be sure, I understand queer theory’s impulse to fight fire with fire. If 
sexual regulation is a matter of bean-counting pleasure and pain in the world, queer theory’s 
claim that sex, even sexual abjection, is hedonistically necessary helps to ensure that sexual 
liberty is not easily discarded for sexual security. Countering sex-as-spectacular-ruination 
with sex-as-spectacular-transcendence feels like the liberating move. In turn, declaring sex 
to be “meh,” rather than highlighting its jouissance, risks maintaining overregulation. 
 Nevertheless, fighting one spectacular narrative with another has drawbacks. Sexual 
over- and under-regulation have historically stemmed from the public preoccupation with 
sex’s potential for spectacular harm and its potential for spectacular pleasure. Think of the 
parent who tells a teen to abstain until marriage. The parent warns of rape and pregnancy 
risk while counseling that sex is so transcendent that one should “save it” for marriage. As 
Michel Foucault reminds us, pleasure is power : “Pleasure and power do not cancel or turn 
back against one another; they seek out, overlap, and reinforce one another. They are linked 
together by complex mechanisms and devices of excitation and incitement.”113 
 Political work is already done when we view sex in terms of polar endpoints of 
pleasure and pain, even where we are careful to map that pleasure and pain in a complex 
matrix: painful pain (violent rape), pleasurable pain (abjection-transcendence), pleasurable 
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pleasure (lesbian intimacy), and painful pleasure (feels good but emotionally devastating).114 
In her seminal article Pleasure and Danger, Vance begins by examining the threats posed by 
feminists and moralists to “sexual freedom.” Within a few pages, sexual liberation has 
transformed into “sexual desire.”115 This overlooks that people should be liberated to not 
desire sex and to have sex without, or even against, desire. People can strike bargains in the 
shadow of desire/non-desire. Indeed, Vance elsewhere notes that pleasure-versus-pain is 
inaccurate because “[w]omen’s actual sexual experience is more complicated, more difficult 
to grasp, more unsettling.”116 Queer theory need not limit its redemption efforts to fitting 
all the sex that feminists find unappealing—violent sex, instrumental sex, non-orgasmic 
sex—into the crabbed category of hedonistic desire. 
 When I look into the world, I see a lot of sex that is beneficial, but not pleasurable: 
sex to preserve a relationship; to feel adult; to make another person happy; to have a family; 
to survive in socioeconomic marginality.117 To be sure, some of this undesired sex is “life-
saving,” as Vance observes of sexual pleasure.118 In addition, I see sex that is casual, quick, 
and soon forgotten. This sex is mundane. But there is no room in the popular contemporary 
vocabulary for instrumental or mundane sex. Sex is either good—and when it’s good it’s 
desired, pleasurable, even transcendent—or bad—and when it’s bad, it’s traumatic, 
outrageous, necessarily criminal.119 The #MeToo movement directs women to confess their 
sexual victimhood to be part of the “solution,” starkly illustrating the “compulsory 
discursivity” phenomenon Wendy Brown described in 2005.120 The confession becomes 
the case, even though the case was formulated prior to the solicitation of confessions. 
Brown observes:  
In an age of social identification through attributes marked as culturally significant—
gender, race, sexuality, and so forth—confessional discourse, with its truth-bearing status 
in a postepistemological universe, not only regulates the confessor in the name of freeing 
her . . . but extends beyond the confessing individual to constitute a regulatory truth about 
the identity group: confessed truths are assembled and deployed as “knowledge” about the 
group.121  
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The New York Times, in its ever-expanding sojourn into #MeToo journalism, 
solicited stories from men who would go on the record with a mea culpa about their past bad 
sexual behavior.122 Max Maples related an incident from 2005, when he was 16 or 17 and 
“coerced [his] then-girlfriend” into oral sex. “I don’t believe she voiced any explicit dissent,” 
he recalled, “but I had to cajole to get what I wanted. I clearly remember saying something 
to the effect of ‘Please, could you do that one thing again.’” 123 Maples lamented that his 
actions could have left her feeling “violated.” He contacted his ex to make sure it was ok 
to go public, and “interestingly, she didn’t even remember the incident in question.”124 Still, 
he regarded his bad actions as Times-worthy because “I do know girls who have felt assaulted 
in that same situation.”125  
 Our current sexual sensibilities leave little room for forgetting. Not feminism, nor 
queer theory, nor left politics, nor right politics concern themselves with the many fleeting 
sexual interactions that produce indifference, frustration, or mild negative or positive 
emotions, and which are quickly forgotten or relegated to the lower recesses of the psyche. 
They leave out sex that is purely instrumental to other ends. They ignore entire demographic 
categories of people—i.e. post-menopausal women who do not want testosterone 
treatment—for whom sex is a low priority.126 Government health messages and cultural 
norms link not having, not desiring, or not caring enough about sex to a host of physical 
and psychological disorders—the messages more ideological than scientific. Public health 
scholar Juliet Richters observed in 2009:  
[E]mpirical sex researchers repeatedly encounter the fact that for many people sex is not 
very important at all, and perhaps has never given them much pleasure. They respond to 
the social expectation that sex is terribly desirable with boredom, avoidance, 
embarrassment or derision. . . . [M]ost people obey the social injunction to care about sex, 
to value it and they try to obey the rules . . ., especially the expectation that they should 
have sex regularly with their partner, if they have one.127 
  Sex researchers, in fact, have proclaimed that “celibacy is the new deviance.”128 
Given this, declaring sex to be “meh” may just be today’s most eccentric queer theoretic 
move. Understanding that sex’s importance is not pre-political, natural, or empirically based 
creates a better vantage point from which to determine when sex is a pretext or proxy for 
other value contests and when sexual histrionics substitute for careful analysis of complex 
social phenomena.  
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 In our current political atmosphere of polarization and insecurity, where feminist 
or “due-process” stances on sexual wrongdoing have become markers of political virtue, 
we might expect sex to play an ever-larger role in the expression of social anxiety. Rubin 
observes:  
[I]t is precisely at times such as these, when we live with the possibility of unthinkable 
destruction, that people are likely to become dangerously crazy about sexuality. 
Contemporary conflicts over sexual values and erotic conduct have much in common with 
the religious disputes of earlier centuries. They acquire immense symbolic weight. Disputes 
over sexual behaviour often become the vehicles for displacing social anxieties, and 
discharging their attendant emotional intensity. Consequently, sexuality should be treated 
with special respect in times of great social stress.129 
In the case of now-Justice Brett Kavanaugh, the political left rightly worried about his 
dishonesty, partisan hackery, and threat to minority empowerment. However, all these 
concerns were filtered through the lens of alleged forty-year-old sexual misconduct. 
Democrats lost that sexual proxy war, and we are left with a Supreme Court that poses an 
existential threat to civil liberties and a political left more willing than ever to abandon their 
civil libertarian, due-process sentiments when it comes to accusations of past sexual wrong-
doing.130  
 Today, #MeToo and its rapid takedown of men accused of sexual misbehavior are 
touted as the road to women’s fair representation in the halls of power. The New York Times 
recently proclaimed, “#MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half of Their 
Replacements Are Women.”131 Elle Magazine featured awkward profiles of some of the 
women who received these plum positions and struggle to describe their “objective” 
qualifications for the job. In dominance feminists’ ultimate capitalist triumph, men’s 
inherently sexual (and sexually assaultive) nature is giving women a leg up in a neoliberal 
market. “Women have always been seen as risky, because they might do something like 
have a baby. But men are now being seen as more risky hires,” law professor Joan Williams 
observed.132 Echoing these sentiments, Michigan attorney general candidate Dana Nessel 
ran an ad emphasizing the need for more women in power, explaining, “Who can you trust 
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most not to show you their penis in a professional setting?”133 Dominance feminism lost 
the sex wars, but it may now be winning the battle of the sexes.  
 However, when sex is the proxy for women’s battle for economic equality, 
something very important is lost. Women’s status as non-harassers may confer some market 
power, but it obscures that unconstrained capitalism is a primary barrier to women’s 
economic quality. In fact, some have begun to tout unconstrained managerial power as 
necessary for employers to quickly dispatch sexual harassers. Elizabeth Nolan Brown, 
founder of “Feminists for Liberty,” remarked, “The modern American capitalist system . . . has 
delivered social justice more swiftly and effectively than supposedly more enlightened 
public bodies tend to. As we observe and adjust to the sociosexual storm we’re all in, let’s 
appreciate the powers and paradigms making it possible: feminism, but also free 
markets.”134  
 Given that men remain disproportionately empowered within the free market 
system, #MeToo’s message that men and women cannot co-work without the interposition 
of a penis may backfire. On December 3, 2018, Bloomberg published “Wall Street Rule for 
the #MeToo Era: Avoid Women at All Cost,” reporting on interviews with more than thirty 
senior executives. In diametric opposition to professor Williams’s sentiments, one exec 
remarked that “just hiring a woman is an unknown risk.” Further, “A late-40-something in 
private equity said he has a new rule, established on the advice of his wife, an attorney: no 
business dinner with a woman 35 or younger.”135 
B. Sex Indifference in Practice 
Avital Ronell, a queer female NYU professor, was disciplined by the institution for 
sexually harassing her queer male graduate student, Nimrod Reitman. The case sparked 
national headlines and public outrage at Ronell, with only a few critics expressing skepticism 
toward Reitman. Some of the facts of the case are hotly contested, such as whether Ronell 
groped and sexually touched Reitman without consent.136 What is not contested is that 
during their several years of working together, Ronell established—Reitman would say 
coerced—an intimate personal relationship with Reitman and sent him numerous over-the-
top emails.137 “My sweet delight, dear Nimrod,” she wrote, “I will hold you close to my 
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heart silently, as I once did, and just listen to your intimate rhythm, heart, heart, your 
breathing, heart, heart. I liked when you would drift off and I could lose myself in your soft 
breathing.”138 Some of the communications were laced with sexual innuendo, for example, 
“I’ll see you at the orifice, I mean office,” and “It’s your cock-er-spaniel calling.”139 
1. The Feminist Sex-as-Danger Gloss 
The sexual nature of Ronell’s overreach destined the case for spectacular 
controversy. The Ronell-Reitman relationship existed within several structures of power 
and hierarchy, but the sexual subordination structure was surely not foremost among them. 
The shadow that loomed over Reitman’s bargaining with Ronell was not patriarchal false 
consciousness or the “tolerated residuum” of men’s sexual abuse of women.140 Rather, he 
bargained from an unequal position as the student of a powerful professor who, according 
to Reitman and others, had unfettered power to make or break his career.141 Reitman 
accused Ronell of using her academic power to force an inappropriately personal relationship, 
which is certainly a far cry from the penile penetration held out as the ultimate manifestation 
of patriarchal dominance. As one commentator put it, “Although Reitman experienced an 
abuse of power, his experiences do not represent the structural sexism that the feminist 
movement has long been fighting.”142 
 A dominance feminist might make the argument, as MacKinnon has elsewhere, that 
anyone who engages in harmful sexual contact operatively becomes male and the victim 
female. Thus, punishing women offenders and protecting male victims furthers the goal of 
dismantling patriarchy. But this definitional argument feels particularly tortured. Why 
wouldn’t women standing up to men and sexually dominating them be the quickest route 
to toppling male supremacy? It sure seems more direct than relying on masculinist police 
officers to cabin male dominant sexuality. Perhaps one could make a distributional 
argument that strict and gender-neutral sexual harassment laws sacrifice some women, but 
they have the larger effect of taking down men who form the bulk of harassers. On the 
other hand, focusing on women’s sexual misconduct might produce a false equivalence that 
lets men off the hook. Ronell herself made this argument, stating that focusing on her 
“allows for patriarchy to say, ‘See, there’s a predator woman—they have libidos, too—so 
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now leave us alone so we can go around and have our encounters with 18-year-old girls.’”143 
In any case, feminists with an inclination to view the Ronell case differently than a 
heterosexual male-on-female sexual assault case were immediately put on the defensive. 
Conservative pundits reported with glee that Judith Butler and others, whom they 
designated “feminists,” wrote a letter defending Ronell, another “feminist.”144 This was 
smoking-gun evidence that feminists were hypocrites who would betray their anti-rape 
philosophy to protect their own. Butler et al. penned a tone-deaf character reference for 
Ronell, emphasizing Ronell’s “international standing and reputation” and warning that 
sanctions would “invite widespread and intense public scrutiny” of NYU.145 Lisa Duggan 
rationalized the letter as a “hastily concocted” strategy to persuade NYU not to take the 
“draconian” penalty of termination.146 Duggan’s strategic diagnosis may be correct, but I 
prefer the take of Amy Elizabeth Robinson (quoting Derrida):  
It strikes me that in writing and signing and sending the letter these privileged scholars 
were deploying a rough and urgent form of justice (we seek to register in clear terms our 
objection to any judgment against her), held up against the calculations of law, perhaps 
acting with a sort of panicked madness, at a moment of “anxiety-ridden suspense,” in “the 
night of non-knowledge and non-rule.”147 
After a barrage of criticism and the emergence of additional facts, Butler fell on the sword: 
“In hindsight, those of us who sought to defend Ronell against termination surely ought to 
have been more fully informed of the situation.”148 Still for many, like blogger Brian Leiter, 
that letter was conclusive proof of feminist hypocrisy.149 Leiter warned that the “feminist” 
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letter, which did not name Reitman, made the signatories “liable for retaliation” and even 
defamation.150 Yet not so long before, he excoriated Northwestern’s “Kafkaesque” 
treatment of author Laura Kipnis after she publicly criticized the school’s disciplining of a 
male philosophy professor for sexual misconduct. Leiter lamented, “If Kipnis’s opinion 
piece about sexual paranoia on campus, in which the graduate student is not even named 
and barely referenced, constitutes adverse ‘treatment,’ then there is no right for any faculty 
member . . . to offer any opinions.”151 What seemed to particularly offend Leiter about 
Butler’s letter was that it designated Ronell a philosophy “rock star.”152 “Her most-cited 
authored work . . . has been cited about 560 times, less than, for example, my 2002 book 
on Nietzsche,” he remarked.153 Indeed, Leiter’s most bitter indictment of Ronell and her 
supporters was that they engage in postmodern theory, “as they call bad philosophy in 
literature departments.”154 
Feminists went on the defensive, but not by arguing that the heterodox movement 
is more complicated than right-wingers realized and could accommodate a range of views 
on sexual harassment and Title IX. Instead, the “real” #MeToo activists responded that 
Ronell is no feminist, and her defenders are no different from the rape-culture-promoting 
male defenders of bad men.155 #MeToo sympathizers were more than happy to pile on to 
Ronell, adamantly insisting that her egregious conduct toward Reitman was 
indistinguishable from a heterosexual male CEO’s actions toward a female subordinate. 
What emerged was a mainstream feminist condemnation of Ronell’s sexual misconduct that 
completely removed gender and sexual orientation, or any context other than academic 
power, from the equation. Conservative commentators also highlighted Ronell’s sexual 
deviance to stoke suspicion—perhaps well-founded—that #MeToo was more about taking 
down men than neutrally policing “real” sexual predation. For mainstream feminists and 
conservatives alike, Ronell became the very exemplar of how a gay older woman could also 
be a sexual predator.  
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2. The Queer Sex-as-Play Gloss 
Ronell advanced several claims to paint her communications as something other 
than a sexually exploitative exercise of power. She protested that, in her mind, this was the 
“zany and affectionate,” belle époque, continental, creative, eccentric—and I might add 
caring-yet-sexually-playful in a cultural feminist way—language.156 She used it with all her 
West Village friends, who desired liberation from the boring vernacular of the day. Ronell’s 
more political argument sounded in queer identity. She asserted, “Our communications—
which Reitman now claims constituted sexual harassment—were between two adults, a gay 
man and a queer woman, who share an Israeli heritage, as well as a penchant for florid and 
campy communications arising from our common academic backgrounds and 
sensibilities.”157  
 Some equality-minded commentators did not take so kindly to the recasting of the 
allegedly harassing statements as queer communicative practice. One commentator lashed 
out against Ronell’s characterization of the communications as “gay coded,” arguing that it 
“equates queer sexuality with harassment and abuse, a thoroughly homophobic 
characterization.”158 An alternative argument is that Ronell’s speech may have the trappings 
of gay code, but it could also be a case of “‘queer kinship’ being used to mask a coercive 
dynamic.”159 To be sure, there may be a distinction between the emotionally freighted 
Ronell-Reitman exchanges and what people think of as typical—or stereotypical—gay 
banter.160  
 Still, many theorists bristled at mainstream feminists’ basic instinct to retrofit the 
floridly intimate communicative practices between a queer adult woman and man with a 
heterosexual male-dominance verbal sexual harassment frame. I would venture that most 
queer left academics do not communicate with close professional associates, much less 
students, through Flaubert-tinged love-speak and sexual innuendos. Nevertheless, in the 
world of academic communications, those between and among queer left academics are 
probably more comparatively sexually playful, than those between and among other 
scholars. Duggan argues:  
The nature of the email exchange resonates with many queer academics, whose practices 
of queer intimacy are often baffling to outsiders. Forms of intimacy well outside the 
parameters of heterosexual (and homosexual) courtship and marriage are commonplace 
among queers . . . . The correspondence between Ronell and Reitman, full of literary 
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allusions [alternatively,] can be read literally as an indicator of a sexual relationship. This is 
a culture clash.161 
Moreover, Duggan argues, viewing sex-laced communication through a dominance feminist 
heterosexual-subordination lens, without any “gay-code” contextualizing, poses 
disproportionate risks to queer academics, especially given the still-extant vulnerabilities of 
those considered deviant. She notes: 
Because queers are hypersexualized in the public imagination, they are targets for sexual 
accusations. For example, a queer femme accused of being seductive, for wearing skirts 
and speaking in a “throaty voice” in class. A trans man accused of inappropriate advances 
toward a colleague, not a student and not at the same institution. A faculty member charged 
for the content of a queer studies class. It is remarkable as well that the majority of cases 
in my small but growing collection involve faculty of color, particularly black faculty.162 
3. The Sex-Indifferent Gloss 
Duggan criticizes the mainstream feminist position that Ronell is indistinguishable 
from other sexual harassers for being inattentive to the stigmatization of queer sexuality. At 
the same time Duggan’s (and Ronell’s) “playfulness” defense of the sex-tinged speech 
exhibits the redemptive, pastoral quality of many queer defenses of sexuality. Others have 
been less sanguine about, even disquieted by, Ronell’s behavior toward Reitman, but remain 
reluctant to deem Ronell a “sexual” harasser and deviant. The real problem, they contend, 
is not sexual abuse but the abuse of power that runs rampant in professor-graduate student 
relationships. Indeed, one of the foremost insights that emerged from the commentary on 
the Ronell “catastrophe” is that the archaic master-servant relationship between Ph.D. 
advisors and advisees has long outlived its propriety.163 Corey Robin wrote in The Chronicle 
of Higher Education, “Depending on whom you believe, Ronell’s claims on Reitman may or 
may not have been for sex, but the sex was only one part of the harassment. Ronell’s largest 
claims were on his time, on his life, on his attention and energy, well beyond the legitimate 
demands of an adviser on an advisee.”164 Masha Gessen noted, “It matters that he identifies 
as gay and she as a lesbian, because it makes us question how important the sexual really is 
in sexual harassment.”165 
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This body of commentary is, in fact, sex-indifferent. For these observers, whether 
Ronell’s overreach was sexual in nature is beside the point. Let me add the important caveat 
that Reitman appears not to have been indifferent to the sexual nature of the relationship. 
Moreover, had NYU sustained the claim that Ronell coerced him into sexual acts, 
commentators would not easily dismiss sex as “not the issue.” Nevertheless, many of these 
sex-indifferent commentators entertain the picture of a Ronell who was emotionally but 
not necessarily sexually needy and a Reitman who resisted that type of relationship, 
including the sexual/intimate communications within it, but did not voice his views, or 
voice them strongly, because he feared professional repercussions. One Facebook post, 
ostensibly by a student insider, identified Ronell’s means of manipulation, not as masculine 
sexual coercion, but distinctly feminine fragility:  
When people talk about sexual harassment it’s within the logic of the symbolic order—
penetration, body parts—I doubt you will find much of this here. But . . . AR [Avital Ronell] 
pulls students and young faculty in by flattery, then breaks their self-esteem, goes on to 
humiliate them in front of others, until the only way to tell yourself and others that you 
have not been debased, that you have not been used by a pathological narcissist as a private 
slave, is that you are just so incredibly close, and that Avi is just so incredibly fragile and 
lonely and needs you 24/7 to do groceries, to fold her laundry, to bring her to acupuncture, 
to pick her up from acupuncture, to drive her to JFK, to talk to her at night, etc.166 
In this view, Ronell’s students are compelled into non-sexual labor by her power combined 
with female-style emotional manipulation, not male-style sexual dominance.  
 The account of Ivy-league graduate education that emerged in the wake of the 
Ronell scandal is troubling. I will put aside the contested issues of whether Ph.D. advisers 
are so invariably powerful that advisees can never freely consent to anything and whether 
we should celebrate or denigrate these close, messy, generative, complex, admiration-laden, 
resentment-creating relationships.167 Even so, the disturbing picture is one of elite 
professors with discretion to pick and develop students, applying the criteria of their 
choosing. Those students go on to be the .001%, who then reproduce the pattern. It is not 
unlike Hollywood, where elite producers have total discretion to decide who will become a 
famous star and make millions of dollars.168 The coercive force that allows these professors 
and producers to extort sex, labor, or false affection is distinctly neoliberal—people are 
coerced by the temptation to be at the top of an unequal socioeconomic order. The prized 
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spot as an advisee of an academic celebrity is made all the more valuable by a collapsing 
academic market and the “adjunctification” of the professoriate. Reitman’s lawsuit, indeed, 
emphasizes Ronell’s elite connections and highlights her email to him stating, “Half our 
department was hired by Yale and Harvard, etc. So the plan is for you to get a super job 
wherever and whenever you want, and I am talking about the realm of possibility, even 
probability here.”169 
 That those with power coerce those who seek power is certainly a cost of these 
discretion-based elite hierarchies.170 Discretionary hierarchy also creates the potential that 
those who seek power will mistreat those with it. Indeed, some of Ronell’s defenders cast 
Reitman as the wrong-doer, manipulating a trusting, loving older woman—essentially 
leading her on emotionally—to secure an unfair advantage.171 But these are far from the 
only costs of a discretionary system of power and money. The graduate school and 
Hollywood stories of people “doing anything” to please the star decision-maker highlight 
the vast inequality between those who make it and those who do not.172 In a more egalitarian 
world, the coercive temptation of fame and riches—or any stable employment in the 
precarious worlds of entertainment and graduate studies—would naturally decrease. 
Unfettered discretion perpetuates elitism, classism, and the unequal concentration of 
wealth. Reitman’s complaint against Ronell details the pressure and harms he felt, but it also 
reads like a novel set in the belle époque. There is Paris—her apartment, his friend’s pied-
a-terre. There is Israel—he of a prominent family, she of the glorious intelligentsia. There 
is the West Village, New York opera with his mother, champagne and kisses, Princeton, 
Harvard, and Yale. This is not the stuff of hierarchical repression. It is the stuff of hierarchy 
reproduction.  
 And this circles back to the problem of sex wars as proxy wars. In a practical sense, 
#MeToo might be today’s best substitute for a program of gender affirmative action in 
power positions. Yes, Dr. Blasey-Ford’s testimony might have taken down Kavanaugh. Yes, 
the Ronell sexual harassment case might have provoked a “necessary” conversation about 
the structure of graduate education. However, if sexual harm is the portal through which 
to reach other issues, we will always have tunnel vision. Commentators say that the Ronell 
case will produce a positive reexamination of graduate school structure. However, the 
inherent she-said/he-said, perpetrator-versus-victim structure of sexual harassment law and 
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policy makes this unlikely.173 We are so concerned about who is the bad actor, we forget 
about the script. Duggan laments, “If we focus on this one case, these details, this accuser 
and accused, we will miss the opportunity to think about the structural issues. If we are 
social justice feminists and not neoliberals, we care about the broad structures of power, 
and not individual bad apples case by case.”174  
Consider this bad-apple analysis from Jo Livingstone in The New Republic:  
The Ronell cheerleaders are almost universally intellectuals who once upon a time 
considered themselves cultural outsiders—queer theorists, postcolonial scholars, feminist 
thinkers. They act as if they are a politicized coalition defending a vulnerable person, 
without the awareness that they are now the tenured, the published, the well-off, the 
powerful: precisely the demographic that #MeToo proposes to investigate.175 
For Livingstone, anyone in the powerful “demographic” is suspect and a candidate for 
retributive wrath for alleged sexual impropriety. I think left-feminists should fight the 
temptation to see every case as a race to the bottom, where the party who appears to reside 
there has a moral claim to toppling the one above. As we know from those postmodernists 
so trashed by conservatives during the Ronell affair,176 power is “contextual” and “riven 
with paradox.”177 Power is not easy to trace or understand, and it does not necessarily map 
on to a “demographic” like “tenured.” Livingstone sees professors as empowered vis-à-vis 
students, just as crime victims’ rights advocates see criminal defendants as empowered vis-
à-vis victims. But the consumerist university disrupts that linear model.178 Add to this a 
powerful Title IX bureaucracy bent on protecting the university from lawsuits and a 
#MeToo social media movement powerful enough to make anyone civiliter mortuus, and the 
idea that Ronell is vulnerable seems a bit less outrageous.  
 More importantly, even if Livingstone is correct that Ronell is a fully culpable and 
powerful abuser, disciplining her for sexual harassment does not disrupt the structure that 
made such abuse possible. Taking down a powerful person on sex grounds may provide a 
sense of righteous justice to victims and their supporters and, if one believes in deterrence, 
stop powerful people from doing bad sex things in the future. It does not, however, alter 
the structure that makes sexual abusers and nonsexual abusers so powerful. One can 
imagine that in the wake of the Ronell case, professors will not engage in banter that is 
remotely intimate or sexual. There will probably be official policies on it. However, I doubt 
that the discretionary “rock star” system of Ph.D. advising will be much altered. The 
professors who are disciplined for harassment will continue to be those whose behavior 
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was tinged with sex—running the gamut from queer to creepy to criminal. It will not be the 
abusive, rigidly hierarchical, totally unfair bosses, who, for example, adopt the “Pence 
Rule.”179 
 With that, I rest my very preliminary case in favor of a queer, but sex-indifferent, 
approach to contemporary sex regulation. Queer theory and early dominance feminism’s 
caution to keep an eye on invisible structures of hierarchy and how law interacts with those 
structures is more important than ever as the sex regulation discussion is ruled by feminist 
dogma, viral social-media sloganeering, and authoritarian sentiments. We should be careful 
to follow the interstitial tides of power as people operate in the shadow of regulatory 
regimes created by sex concerns. In our #MeToo moment, sexual harm claims have 
political traction, and those with various normative agendas, from left to conservative, 
increasingly package their agendas as sex claims. The focus on sexual harm as a proxy 
naturally leads to broadening the concept of sexual harm so it has more power to create 
normative (non-sexual) change. Although #MeToo activists’ collapsing of the continuum 
creates a dangerously capacious notion of sexual assault, sex radicals and queer theorists 
should not invariably respond with charges of moralistic sex panic. Rather, we can be 
attuned to the larger agendas at stake, how filtering them through sex undermines or 
furthers them, and whether those sex wars are unnecessary and costly proxy wars. 
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